世界能源展望2022：全球宏观经济和能源市场前景（英）-equinor.pdf

2022 Energy Perspectives Global macroeconomic and energy market outlook 2 | Energy Perspectives 2022 WE BUILD TOO MANY WALLS AND NOT ENOUGH BRIDGES Sir Isaac Newton Energy Perspectives 2022 | 3 Welcome to Equinor’s Energy Perspectives 2022 Meeting global climate goals through an energy transition is an immense challenge that requires commitment from governments, industry and individuals alike. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine earlier this year has not only tragically impacted the lives and livelihoods of those directly affected, but the associated geopolitical tensions have also further deteriorated global cooperation and trade and supply flows on which a sustainable energy transition is completely dependent. Security of energy supply has come to the forefront of the energy policy agenda, with rising energy prices and unprecedented overall cost of living, keeping energy affordability firmly on the agenda as well. In order to bring the world on track to address long-term sustainability challenges in a balanced manner, trust, cooperation, and burden-sharing must be established. This will take time and is by no means guaranteed. As long as short-termism and local priorities dominate policy making, the necessary global changes in the direction of sustainable development will be delayed. Energy Perspectives presents two distinct scenarios for the future world economy, international energy markets and energy-related greenhouse gas emissions. The scenarios are not predictions, but possible contrasting pathways, providing a platform for debate and decision making. The two scenarios, Walls and Bridges, illustrate very different future pathways driven by a variety of factors, ranging from economic growth and technological development to climate policy and geopolitics. The scenarios aim to highlight the immense challenges that must be overcome to make the move from the slow, incremental changes that characterise the energy transition today (Walls), to the radical changes needed to move the world onto a path aligned with the 1.5°C ambition of the Paris Agreement (Bridges). We are committed to being a leader in the energy transition. Energy Perspectives provides me and my colleagues with crucial insight about the outcome space within which we have to balance our strategic priorities. Anders Opedal President and CEO Walls divide and bridges connect. Our new scenarios paint a large outcome space for what the long-term energy future might look like based on choices made today and going forward. Eirik Wærness Senior vice president and Chief economist 4 | Energy Perspectives 2022 Energy Perspectives 2022 presents two scenarios for economic and energy market development, Walls and Bridges . Walls builds on current energy market trends and energy and climate policies, assuming climate action to progress at a slowly accelerating pace in the future. Bridges is a normative back-cast complying with the 1.5°C carbon budget, demonstrating the enormous and sustained efforts required to reach this target. D e c a r b o n i s a t i o n A f f o rdabi li t y S e c u r i t y Extreme weather War in Europe Cost of living crisis Sustainable energy policy 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Walls Bridges History Global fossil fuel demand Gtoe IEA (history), Equinor (projections) Key insights from Energy Perspectives 2022 Policy-makers’ focus has shifted repeatedly over the last 18 months This is due to the cost-of-living crisis, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and extreme weather events. Sustainable energy policy requires maintaining between these competing priorities to be maintained. Peak demand for fossil fuels arrives before 2030 In Walls, the peak occurs in 2026, followed by a gentle downward trajectory. In Bridges, fossil fuel demand declines at a rapid pace after 2025. By 2050, all remaining fossil fuel use is either fully abated or compensated by carbon removal. WALLS BRIDGES Gas demand will continue to grow in Walls, but declines sharply in Bridges In Walls, gas demand peaks in 2041 and is around 10% higher than today’s level in 2050. In Bridges, gas demand peaks in 2025 and falls to around a quarter of today’s level in 2050. Energy consumption shifts towards electricity In Walls, electrification accelerates steadily towards 2050, increasing its share by half. In Bridges, a massive acceleration happens before 2030. By 2050, the share exceeds 50%, two and a half times as large as today. The growth of wind rather globalisation with a new ruleset: reglobalisation. WILD CARD: Even with the positive momentum of the Inflation Reduction Act, the election of a US republican president in 2024 could fast overturn Biden’s policies on climate, energy, trade, and security (Nato). In the short term, US global leadership will also be hampered by internal divisions and isolationist impulses. 18 | Energy Perspectives 2022 Global economy In 2021, the global economy rebounded following the Covid-19 pandemic economic downturn. Global economic growth in 2021 was 5.9% compared to the 3.4% contraction in 2020. Growth was strong among most economies. The Eurozone economy expanded by 5.3%, the US economy by 5.7%, and the Chinese economy by 8.1%. Globally, GDP recovered to the pre- pandemic level in the first quarter of 2021. As Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 global growth expectations for the year were significantly reduced. Russia and Ukraine account for a relatively small part of the global economy, but they are important suppliers of energy, food commodities, fertilisers, and certain metals. The war has led to the destruction of Ukrainian production capacity, disruption of supply chains and economic sanctions on Russia. These developments have contributed to supply shortages and increased price levels for the goods mentioned above. As a consequence, the global economy has slowed during the first half of 2022. Europe is the region most significantly hit by the war in Ukraine. Prior to the war, Russia was the EU’s main energy provider, supplying almost 40% of gas and significant amounts of oil and coal. While the EU is working towards reducing its dependence on Russian energy, any shortages will have major economic consequences for the region. Governments are expected to seek to shield households, in which case shortages could mean significant contractions in industry. Germany, Italy and other central European countries are most at risk. High global food prices will hit emerging markets the hardest. As global food price increases are exacerbated by the war, emerging markets are particularly vulnerable to food price inflation or potential food shortages. Several African and Middle East countries are dependent on wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine. Following a period of significant export disruptions, grain exports by ship have tentatively started again. High costs of fertilisers could also cause disruption of domestic food production in many countries, including in advanced economies. While Latin America and Asia are less dependent on Russian and Ukrainian food commodities, high global food and fertilizer prices could put significant strains on these regions. China’s Covid-19 restrictions continue to be a key risk factor in the global economy. The lockdown in Shanghai and other Chinese cities during the second quarter of 2022 exacerbated existing global supply chain disruptions following the pandemic as it disrupts Chinese goods manufacturing and export. While it is expected that potential future lockdowns will be less severe as China has moved towards “societal zero-Covid”, any major lockdown will have negative consequences for the global economy. The US economy has shown resilience and is expected to gain economically from the war in the short term. US energy exports will be key for Europe as it reduces reliance on Russian fossil fuels. However, surging US inflation followed by monetary tightening will restrain growth. Two consecutive quarterly declines in GDP during spring/summer 2022 raised recession fears. Inflation is set to remain high in the near term, before easing. A tight labour market and high consumer spending have caused concerns about a price-wage upward spiral fuelling inflation. -30 0 30 60 90 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 Agriculture raw materials Non-fuel Fertilisers Food Projection World commodity prices % change y/y Source: © Oxford Economics Limited 2022 Energy Perspectives 2022 | 19 Outlook to 2025 Two extraordinary events, the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have dominated the headlines in the past couple of years and have left their mark on energy markets and the short-term commodity demand forecast. Covid-19 had a shock effect on energy demand in 2020 with the oil market being hardest hit. Oil demand fell due to a significant drop in the transport sector, as people refrained from travelling to work and using air transport for holidays and business appointments. Gas demand proved resilient to the impact of Covid-19 in the western world but suffered in Asia due to dampened industrial activity. Electricity demand in the residential sector increased during the peak of the pandemic as people were forced to spend more time at home, but this was by far outweighed by the decline in demand from the commercial and industrial sectors during the same period. Whilst Covid-19 is still very much present, the implications for energy markets have proven to be short-lived. All markets made a strong recovery during 2021 and 2022 as activity returned to pre- Covid levels. The less severe health implications of the more recent variants, combined with impressive vaccine rollouts in large parts of the world, mean that the Covid-19 virus has become part of a new normal way of life. With Covid-19 posing less of a threat the focus has shifted, and the need for sustained economic growth now outweighs the risk posed by the virus. Recent whole-city lockdowns in China bear witness to a more drawn-out return to normal in Asia, leading to some lingering impacts on energy demand rebound and continued disruptions to global supply chains. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have a significant impact on energy markets in the next decade. Geopolitical tensions and the weaponisation of commodities will force a change in the energy mix and trade flows. Outside Russia, the impact of the war will be most severely felt in Europe, as declining, if not non-existent, gas flows from Russia are replaced by other energy sources and energy efficiencies in addition to LNG (Liquefied natural gas) and alternative pipeline imports. Build out of renewable capacity will be accelerated as part of the REPowerEU ambition, with lifetime extensions of coal and nuclear power plants helping to fill the supply gap in the short term. Russian oil and gas will find other outlets than Europe, with increased supply available to the domestic markets and export to Asia. Demand destruction may be seen across all commodities and regions as a result of limited or lack of supply and high prices. Global LNG supply is likely to prove insufficient to meet demand, as Russian flows are reduced and potentially switched off altogether, with the supply deficit and higher prices leading to demand destruction. Russian oil supply is unlikely to return to pre-war levels. 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Coal Oil Gas Electricity -8 -4 0 4 8 12 2016 2019 2022 2025 China CIS EU North America World Projection Coal, oil, gas and electricity demand Indexed 2019 = 100 GDP growth % change y/y Source: IEA (history), Equinor (projections) Source: © Oxford Economics Limited 2022 (history), Equinor (forecast from June 2022) Commodities Oil Oil markets remain volatile, driven by supply and demand uncertainty. Sanctions on Russian oil following the invasion of Ukraine, Opec+ failing to deliver on their agreed production as well as supply disruptions in other regions, have led to fears of supply shortages. A downward revision of global economic growth, continued lockdowns in China and high prices lead to decreased demand. Market volatility is expected to remain high in the short term, with considerable upside and downside risk, dependent on how events unfold. Power Power prices will remain stretched between the need for security of supply and the volatility of underlying commodities. Both will be dependent upon political changes emerging from the ongoing crisis and weather patterns until 2025. A combination of heightened political tension, a higher share of intermittent generation and lack of investment in dispatchable capacity over the past decade has resulted in the delay of around 10 GW of coal capacity retirements in Europe and a shift towards nuclear for reliability. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has taken Europe from being the market of last resort for LNG and coal to a prime location. This in turn has substantially increased the fuel cost for power generation across the world. Power prices will be strongly affected by a worldwide surge in fuel prices and the current market design. The sector is expected to lean heavily towards market reforms to provide corrective measures and accelerate the energy transition. Hydrogen* Hydrogen demand in the energy sector is looking to grow. Current geopolitical and energy market turmoil encumbers the development of a hydrogen market. In an uncertain context, governments could delay their decarbonisation strategies, making it harder for companies to justify investments in emerging low-carbon technologies. While hydrogen is a relevant part of the decarbonisation narrative, short-term market effects will likely postpone its uptake. Gas Short-term outlooks offer little respite to stressed global gas markets. The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline between Russia and Germany would have provided some supply relief, but the project has been halted indefinitely. This has been replaced by increased tightness and reduced flexibility, as rising hostilities between the East and the West disrupt gas flows with global consequences. With very limited options to increase short-term gas supply, global gas markets are volatile and highly sensitive to disruptions in supply and seasonal variations in demand. US liquefied natural gas can buffer but not cure short-term global tightness, and infrastructure bottlenecks, policies and regulations prevent further loosening. The short-term focus is therefore on efficiencies and alternatives to ease the burden of tight balances. *This report does not consider grey hydrogen, i.e. hydrogen produced by reforming natural gas without carbon capture and storage since hydrogen produced in this way is not used for energy-related purposes. 20 | Energy Perspectives 2022 Energy Perspectives 2022 | 21 22 | Energy Perspectives 2022 THE SCENARIOS « Previous Back to table of contents Next » Energy Perspectives 2022 | 23 The scenarios Energy Perspectives 2022 breaks with tradition and presents two scenarios for global de