引导电力市场走向快速脱碳（英）-IEA.pdf

Steering Electricity Markets Towards a Rapid Decarbonisation The IEA examines the full spectrum of energy issues including oil, gas and coal supply and demand, renewable energy technologies, electricity markets, energy efficiency, access to energy, demand side management and much more. Through its work, the IEA advocates policies that will enhance the reliability, affordability and sustainability of energy in its 31 member countries, 11 association countries and beyond. Please note that this publication is subject to specific restrictions that limit its use and distribution. The terms and conditions are available online at www.iea.org/t this will increase to approximately 76% once the People’s Republic of China (“China” hereafter) completes implementing power markets. As such, much of the accelerated decarbonisation will have to be stimulated in the short and medium term in systems that rely on electricity markets to minimise operation costs and – to varying degrees – to attract investments. Status of electricity markets around the world in 2022 IEA. All rights reserved. Steering Electricity Markets Towards a Rapid Decarbonisation Executive summary PAGE | 10 I E A . A ll r ight s r es er v ed. Market forces can support decarbonisation of the power sector when guided and complemented by the implementation of policies designed to match net zero ambition, including effective investment frameworks, carbon pricing and other decarbonisation instruments. As in any other market, a socially optimal equilibrium can only be achieved if all participants are made responsible for all costs and benefits arising from their actions. This is the mechanism by which markets can provide price signals that function as incentives (or disincentives) to guide the decisions of market actors. In the context of decarbonisation, such price signals are not yet optimally aligned. In most power systems in the world, whether co-ordinated by electricity markets or by vertically integrated utilities, externalities due to CO 2 emissions are not completely included as part of power sector costs. This creates substantially distorted price signals that make investments in and operation of carbon-intensive technologies more profitable than they should be, and do not properly recognise the value of low-carbon technologies. Market design needs to be able to adapt to changing landscapes Over the past several decades, liberalisation of electricity markets has been used as a mechanism to ensure efficient dispatching of resources in line with demand and to obtain benefits from competition in system operation and investment. Since the creation of the first liberalised electricity market – in 1982 in Chile – the design of markets has continuously evolved and matured. This does not mean electricity market design has been solved or that any solution could be static in nature. Ongoing changes in policy and technology require that markets be designed to adapt to new landscapes. This is particularly true in the context of short- and medium-term acceleration of decarbonisation of the electricity sector. Procurement of system services is an example of this change. As electricity systems transition away from fossil fuel generation to higher shares of VRE, ensuring secure system operation will need to be based on a different configuration of different components. The fundamental services of energy, flexibility, peak capacity and stability will have to be procured to sufficient levels by using all available technologies. In turn, the assets needed and their respective value to systems will evolve. VRE for instance, can provide substantial volumes of clean, low-cost energy but contributes much less to firm capacity. In contrast, despite not providing a net-positive energy contribution, energy storage can contribute to ramping flexibility and adequacy. Steering Electricity Markets Towards a Rapid Decarbonisation Executive summary PAGE | 11 I E A . A ll r ight s r es er v ed. Power system services in highly decarbonised scenarios, Korea announced pledges scenario, 2020 and 2035 IEA. All rights reserved. Note: Stability is represented by system inertia. Source: IEA (2021), Reforming Korea s Electricity Market for Net Zero. Experience shows how electricity market design can be changed to help decarbonisation Although there is no perfect market, several experiences indicate the main elements of market design that can bring the power sector on track to achieve net zero emissions.  Redesign of short-term wholesale markets to integrate large shares of VRE and open opportunities for modern technologies to provide flexibility.  Creation or redesign of investment frameworks and policy instruments to enable deploying larger amounts of low-carbon electricity generation and to enable new technologies to participate in the markets.  Introduction of carbon pricing to correct distortions due to the lack of recognition of the costs created by greenhouse gas (GHG) externalities. In most systems, this signal is still very low compared to estimates of the actual social costs created by GHGs.  Strengthen adequacy mechanisms, providing incentives to all resources capable of delivering energy in times of distress of the system This report collects evidence from electricity markets around the world to identify several innovations in market design and investment frameworks that provide policy makers with immediate actionable ideas to support a transition to a flexible, decarbonised and affordable power sector. It also draws attention to approaches that synergise with decarbonisation in other sectors. These experiences represent Steering Electricity Markets Towards a Rapid Decarbonisation Executive summary PAGE | 12 I E A . A ll r ight s r es er v ed. examples of one or more of the previously mentioned fundamental elements. Individually and collectively, they provide powerful tools that will hopefully empower policy makers to match pledges with actions. Provided that all governments strengthen their energy and climate policies to meet climate ambitions, electricity markets could function as a tool to significantly support decarbonisation pathways, particularly when synergised with a broader portfolio of policies and regulations. Market design will need to keep evolving and to be revised to stay on the path towards net zero emissions by 2050. We hope that the experiences presented here will serve as the building blocks for rapid decarbonisation of electricity systems. Short-term wholesale market design is first step towards establishing efficient price signals Wholesale markets enable the trading of energy between market players at different time scales; as such, they are the cornerstone of successful market design. Well-designed, short-term wholesale markets are fundamental to being able to leverage the advantages of competition in electricity production and consumption while synergising with and supporting accelerated decarbonisation of the sector. Establishing efficient price signals can provide incentives to market actors to align their decisions with the needs of the system. The overarching aim is to ensure that price signals represent the reality of the system and that they reward services that provide value to it. These price signals are essential to highlight the needs of the system. Examples of particular value to system decarbonisation include generation at times of high demand, lower carbon emissions and flexibility to modify levels of generation or consumption in response to system needs. As technology evolves and the needs of the system change, it is necessary to adapt the design of the wholesale market to ensure that price signals continue to correctly represent the needs of the system and reward the value provided by different assets. Wholesale markets should be designed such that price signals ensure improved representation of the time and geographical value of energy. This can be achieved through increased time resolution, moving gate closure times closer to the hour of delivery, and applying a market model that correctly represents the underlying physical infrastructure. Additionally, to ensure efficient system operation, it is Steering Electricity Markets Towards a Rapid Decarbonisation Executive summary PAGE | 13 I E A . A ll r ight s r es er v ed. important to make sure long-term contracts support risk hedging and investments, but do not impede optimal dispatch on short-term wholesale markets. Embedding decarbonisation instruments in competitive markets Among decarbonisation technologies, wind and solar PV have become the most cost-competitive. Current electricity markets and regulations, however, have not managed to stimulate sufficient investment. To accelerate deployment of low- carbon electricity, it is necessary to close the investment gap by reflecting the cost of negative externalities and introducing additional decarbonisation mechanisms that are compatible with both wholesale market signals and other policy instruments. Several decarbonisation instruments facilitate integration with competitive wholesale market revenues while reducing the overall cost burden that gets passed on to consumers. To implement these decarbonisation mechanisms correctly and efficiently, market design needs to balance providing revenue certainty through long-term signals while encouraging efficient integration in day- to-day power system operations. In the coming years, as VRE comes to account for the majority share in generation, it will be important to introduce market-based instruments to ensure sufficient investment in dispatchable low-carbon assets. To achieve this, policy makers will need to introduce instruments that reward the provision of services such as flexibility and adequacy while maintaining the efficiency of the wholesale market. Maximising the value of distributed energy resources requires changing current market structures The diversification and accelerated deployment of distributed energy resources (DER) worldwide is shifting electricity systems. The past model of centralised, large generators connected to transmission networks with little demand-side control is no longer reflective of how modern systems function. The emergence of decentralised systems, with many distributed resources that are smaller and interconnected, allows both end use devices (e.g. appliances) and consumers to have more active roles. If deployed efficiently, DER offer large potential to support the integration of VRE, increase system resilience and reduce the need for grid upgrade. In addition to providing demand-side response, some DER assets can supply ancillary services Steering Electricity Markets Towards a Rapid Decarbonisation Executive summary PAGE | 14 I E A . A ll r ight s r es er v ed. as sources of flexibility, black start services and non-wire alternatives. To maximise the benefits of DER, it is necessary to adapt markets to reward their true value. Indeed, under current market structures in which system operators often lack visibility of DER, its deployment can create issues and incentivise inefficient behaviours by asset operators, particularly considering the increased electrification that results in higher peak loads and congestions of distribution grids. Ensuring electricity markets are ready to let DER play their role is therefore highly recommended. To make DER visible to system operators, digitalisation should be encouraged. This implies deployment of connected appliances and smart metering infrastructure, supported by effective data exchange structures and appropriate data privacy measures. Digital infrastructure will facilitate the design of electricity tariffs that reflect the locational and time-variant value of electricity and ensure a fair repartition of grid costs, thereby ensuring optimal use of DER. In addition, policy makers should review connection schemes and participation rules and acknowledge the role of aggregators while facilitating their involvement. Lastly, co-operation protocols among stakeholders (particularly transmission and distribution system operators [TSOs and DSOs]) and grid operation processes have to be adapted to the DER-induced shift from the transmission to the distribution system. Market design must recognise the unique role of storage to leverage its advantages Cost reductions in energy storage technologies, especially battery storage, have resulted in increased uptake in various domains of the power system. To support its further deployment and ensure the system value of storage is maximised to support decarbonisation, market design changes must consider its unique role and technological advantages. Storage is unique in its ability to provide flexibility through both load and generation, across a broad range of timescales. As it cannot decarbonise the power system on its own, storage must be part of a package of measures that aims to align market incentives and the generation mix towards decarbonisation to avoid worse emissions outcomes. Taxation and network tariffs must also be adapted to appropriately recognise its role as a flexibility provider, ensuring it is not charged twice as a consumer and as a generator. Finally, specifications for market participation must evolve away from the properties of conventional technologies towards technologically neutral ones that use (and appropriately remunerate) the system services of storage. Design changes to reward technological advantages of storage could focus on fast-response time and geographic flexibility. Remunerating fast response could Steering Electricity Markets Towards a Rapid Decarbonisation Executive summary PAGE | 15 I E A . A ll r ight s r es er v ed. be achieved through shorter time periods or new markets focusing on fast frequency regulation. Remunerating geographic flexibility could be achieved through more granular locational signals or new markets for localised system services. Ensuring system adequacy requires additional measures Policy makers have the duty to set the desired reliability standard for electricity systems and ensure mechanisms are in place to meet it. If they do not properly value all system services, wholesale markets may not sufficiently provide incentives for the assets needed for secure system operation. Even if restrictions on prices (e.g. price caps) were relaxed in the wholesale market, if the quantity of reserves that needs to be procured is not properly valued, the problem of “missing money” arises and can result in underinvestment. Three policy instruments can help solve the missing money problem: energy price adders, capacity-based payments and regulated procurement. These instruments can be used in combination – use of one does not exclude use of the others. Energy price adders embed the cost of procuring reserves into the wholesale market by allowing prices to exceed variable costs during periods of reserves shortages (which indi