中国在全球关键资源开发中的作用：煤电、输电和海底采矿案例研究（英）-兰德.pdf

C O R P O R AT I O N TOM LATOURRETTE, TODD C. HELMUS, IRINA A. CHINDEA China’s Role in the Global Development of Critical Resources Case Studies in Coal Power, Electricity Transmission, and Seabed Mining Research Report For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA2096-1. About RAND The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. To learn more about RAND, visit www.rand.org. Research Integrity Our mission to help improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis is enabled through our core values of quality and objectivity and our unwavering commitment to the highest level of integrity and ethical behavior. To help ensure our research and analysis are rigorous, objective, and nonpartisan, we subject our research publications to a robust and exacting quality-assurance process; avoid both the appearance and reality of financial and other conflicts of interest through staff training, project screening, and a policy of mandatory disclosure; and pursue transparency in our research engagements through our commitment to the open publication of our research findings and recommendations, disclosure of the source of funding of published research, and policies to ensure intellectual independence. For more information, visit www.rand.org/about/research-integrity. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. 2022 RAND Corporation is a registered trademark Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This publication and trademarks contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to its webpage on rand.org is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research products for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. iii About This Report China’s extensive and expanding foreign investment and financing activities over the past approximately 20 years have garnered substantial attention and raised several concerns. The purpose of this report is to explore Chinese investment and financing activities in energy infrastructure and critical minerals. RAND National Security Research Division This research was sponsored by the U.S. Department of State’s Global Engagement Center and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division NSRD. NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Intelligence Community, the U.S. State Department, allied foreign governments, and foundations. For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/isdp or contact the director contact information is provided on the webpage. Acknowledgments We gratefully acknowledge Lev Navarre Chao for his assistance with the literature review and for reviewing and analyzing the coal power plant database; we also thank Samantha Perez Davila and Isabelle Winston for their support with setting up and conducting the interviews for the Latin America chapter. We greatly appreciate the guidance, support, and facilitation of connections from the Global Engagement Center team. We are grateful to all the interview participants for taking the time to share their experiences and insights related to Chinese foreign investments and financing in critical resources. iv Contents About This Report iii Figures and Tables . vi Summary . vii Abbreviations . xi Chapter 1. Introduction . 1 Background and Motivation . 1 Research Approach . 2 Organization of This Report . 3 Chapter 2. Chinese Support for Overseas Coal Power Plants 4 Introduction 4 A Downturn in Coal Power Development 6 Chinese Regulatory Agencies Reduce Support for Overseas Coal 7 What Is the Impact of President Xi’s Policy Statement 8 South Africa 9 Indonesia . 12 Pakistan . 15 Summary . 18 Chapter 3. Electricity Transmission and Distribution in Latin America 19 Overview of GEI and GEIDCO 21 GEI and GEIDCO in Latin America 24 Brazil 27 Chile 29 Peru . 32 Argentina 34 Mexico 36 Summary . 38 Chapter 4. Seabed Mining . 40 Context for Seabed Mining . 41 Chinese Government Positions and Statements About Seabed Mining . 45 Chinese Deep and Distant Ocean Exploration Technology and Activity 46 Chinese Seabed Mining Activity 48 Potential Areas of Concern Regarding China and Seabed Mining 51 Summary . 54 Chapter 5. Recommendations . 57 Chinese Support for Overseas Coal Power Plants 57 Electricity Transmission and Distribution in Latin America 59 Seabed Mining 61 v Appendix A. Advantages and Disadvantages of a Globally Integrated Grid Based on UHV Transmission Lines . 63 Appendix B. Chinese Attempts to Project Influence in the Informational Domain in Latin America . 65 References . 71 vi Figures and Tables Figures Figure 2.1. Total Operating Power from Chinese Supported Coal-Fired Power Plants, 2022 . 5 Figure 2.2. Changes in Status for Chinese-Supported Coal-Fired Power Plants, 2022 9 Figure 2.3. Chinese Support for South African Coal Power . 10 Figure 2.4. Potential Impact of the NDRC Guidelines on Chinese Support for South African Coal-Powered Energy . 11 Figure 2.5. Chinese Support for Indonesian Coal Power 12 Figure 2.6. Potential Impact of the NDRC Guidelines on Chinese Support for Indonesian Coal- Powered Energy 14 Figure 2.7. Chinese Support for Pakistani Coal Power 15 Figure 2.8. Potential Impact of the NDRC Guidelines on Chinese Support for Pakistani Coal- Powered Energy 17 Figure 3.1. Diagram of the 9H-9V Grids Planned by 2070 for GEI Backbone Framework 23 Tables Table 1.1. Case Study Topics and Countries 2 Table 1.2. Interview Statistics . 3 Table 3.1. Summary of Top Chinese Investments and Financing in Power Transmission and Distribution in Latin America and the Caribbean from 2010 to January 2022 20 Table 4.1. ISA Exploration Contracts . 43 Table 4.2. ISA Exploration Contracts Sponsored by China . 44 Table 4.3. Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority Exploration Licenses . 45 vii Summary China’s extensive and expanding foreign investment and financing activities over the past two decades have garnered substantial attention and raised several concerns. Such concerns are diverse and include paying insufficient attention to internal politics, global relations, environmental regulations and controls, and human rights, worker safety, and health records of host nations engaging in unfair contracting practices using overseas investments and financing to attain access and influence in strategic locations using disinformation to influence markets. For this report, we examined Chinese foreign investments and financing in critical resources and energy infrastructure for evidence of these types of behaviors. We used a case-study approach in which we examined investments and financing in coal power plants in Indonesia, Pakistan, and South Africa; electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure associated with the global energy interconnection GEI initiative in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Mexico; and seabed mining globally. These case study topics and the regions of focus were selected at the behest of the sponsor. Our research did not turn up many clear examples of the behaviors noted above but did identify some other topics of concern that have important implications for host nations. Chinese Support for Overseas Coal Power Plants By most measures, China appears to be moving away from its historical support for the development of overseas coal-fired power plants. Still, questions persist regarding whether China intends to fully adhere to the pronouncement by President Xi Jinping and the established Belt and Road Initiative guidelines, which categorically assert that China will not build new coal plants abroad. Since Xi’s announcement in September 2021, China has initiated two new coal plants supporting industrial parks in Indonesia. Further, since the time of Xi’s speech, several plants have moved forward in the development process, and it remains unclear exactly how China will follow through on its promulgated guidelines for plants in the very early stages of development. Under a strict interpretation, such plants should be canceled, though it is likely that some will move forward. Our research led to several recommendations for nations that have built or are considering building Chinese-financed coal power plants. First, it will be critical for industrial parks in Indonesia and elsewhere to replace existing or planned coal plants with renewable energy sources. The international community will need to viii hold China accountable in following through on its promises to not build new coal plants abroad, and it will be critical to persuade host countries, such as Indonesia, that further development of coal for such parks will undermine their net-zero commitments. Second, the international community should seek greater clarity from China on plans for continuing to support coal plants with financing and permits that have not yet begun construction. Although the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission guidelines unambiguously call on Chinese firms to “completely stop new overseas coal power projects,” it seems that such firms are continuing to move forward on at least a selection of permitted and financed projects, which the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air considers to fall within a gray area. The international community should consequently engage Chinese authorities to gain greater clarity on China’s intention for such plants. Third, the international community should help host countries transition from coal. The international community particularly, China, with its dominance in solar panel and wind turbine manufacturing should offer direct financial and construction support for the development of solar and wind energies. Diplomatic engagements and capacity-building initiatives should also be undertaken to help countries, such as Indonesia, address significant bureaucratic impediments to renewable energy. Initiatives such as the Just Energy Transition Partnership in South Africa, in which the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Union will contribute 8.5 billion to help South Africa retire coal plants early, support coal-dependent regions, and turning to renewable energy may also be critical in helping such countries as Indonesia and Pakistan move away from coal. Electricity Transmission and Distribution in Latin America The GEI case study documented relatively few concerns associated with Chinese ownership or control over power transmission and distribution companies in Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Argentina. 1 Most of the concerns raised by those interviewed for this project addressed the nontransparent means in which such projects are financed and the fact that Chinese state-owned enterprises SOEs have a competitive advantage over private competitors from other countries in terms of access to finance under nonmarket conditions. In our review of open-source data and in the interviews conducted for this case study, we did not uncover any major episodes involving Chinese government pressure or attempts at projecting influence that were specifically tied to Chinese investments or financing in power transmission and generation. In the five Latin American countries we focused on for this report, Chinese companies did not appear to engage in predatory lending practices similar to those that have been associated with Chinese firms operating in African and Southeast Asian countries. Chinese investments and financing in Brazil’s, Chile’s, and Peru’s power transmission and distribution sectors consisted 1 In Mexico, there are no Chinese investments in power transmission and distribution. ix of Chinese SOEs buying local companies, with Argentina considering financing options from Chinese banks to expand the power transmission lines in the Buenos Aires area. In Mexico, Chinese companies established new and acquired existing companies in power generation. Neither the government in Beijing nor the Chinese SOEs and private companies on the ground draw an explicit connection between GEI implementation and the investments and financing they conduct in these five Latin American countries. In line with these observations for this case study, we offer the following recommendations for countries in Latin America, as well as for those in other regions of the world that consider Chinese investment and financing options in the power sector. First, it is important for such countries to develop regulatory frameworks for the integration of renewable energy into the overall power grid. Second, these countries should develop regulatory frameworks to address technological and informational components of smart grids. Third, there is a need for more- transparent public tenders. Having a transparent public tender system that meets international best practices and respects local laws may advance the free-market environment and encourage competition among foreign investors. There is also a need to implement screening mechanisms for foreign investments and financing. Local governments should be able to review the financing terms and conditions of foreign investment and financing activities, including asking foreign investors to disclose the source of their capital, and screen for offers that show a preference for including a local component labor and materials and for local laws governing the final contract. As part of such efforts, it will be critical for these countries to nurture the development of a professional and reputable public contracting officer corps in hopes that such professionals can be protected against political pressures. Likewise, it will be important to diversify investment and financing partners because overreliance on investors from one country increases the economic and political vulnerability of the host country to foreign pressures. Seabed Mining China has quickly advanced its technology for deep-sea exploration and did so with little outside collaboration. Some observers emphasize the dual civilian-military use aspects of such capabilities and warn that China’s involvement in seabed mining exploration serves as a means to legitimize various forms of deep- and distant-sea activity and cover for pursuing military objectives. However, we found no evidence to support the notion that China’s seabed mining program is intended as cover for military purposes. Given t