2022年世界能源展望（英）-IEA.pdf

World Energy Outlook 2022 The IEA examines the full spectrum of energy issues including oil, gas and coal supply and demand, renewable energy technologies, electricity markets, energy efficiency, access to energy, demand side management and much more. Through its work, the IEA advocates policies that will enhance the reliability, affordability and sustainability of energy in its 31 member countries, 11 association countries and beyond. Please note that this publication is subject to specific restrictions that limit its use and distribution. The terms and conditions are available online at www.iea.org/t Eni; European Union Global Public Goods and Challenges Programme; Hitachi Energy; Iberdrola; Jupiter Intelligence; Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan; Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, the Netherlands; The Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth, Japan; Shell; Swiss Federal Office of Energy; and Toshiba. The IEA Clean Energy Transitions Programme CETP, particularly through the contributions of the Agence Franaise de Dveloppement, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom supported this analysis. Thanks also go to the IEA Energy Business Council, IEA Coal Industry Advisory Board, IEA Energy Efficiency Industry Advisory Board and the IEA Renewable Industry Advisory Board. IEA. CC BY 4.0. Acknowledgements 7 Peer reviewers Many senior government officials and international experts provided input and reviewed preliminary drafts of the report. Their comments and suggestions were of great value. They include Keigo Akimoto Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth, Japan Venkatachalam Anbumozhi Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia ERIA Doug Arent National Renewable Energy Laboratory NREL, United States Neil Atkinson Independent consultant Andrey Augustynszik International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis IIASA Peter Bach Danish Energy Agency Shan Baoguo State Grid Energy Research Institute, China Manuel Baritaud European Investment Bank Paul Baruya World Coal Association Tom Bastin UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy BEIS Harmeet Bawa Hitachi Energy Lee Beck Clean Air Task Force Christian Besson Independent consultant Sama Bilbao y Leon World Nuclear Association Jorge Blazquez BP Jason Bordoff Columbia University, United States Mick Buffier Glencore Nick Butler King’s College London Ben Cahill Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS, United States Diane Cameron Nuclear Energy Agency Kimball Chen Global LPG Partnership Drew Clarke Australian Energy Market Operator Rebecca Collyer European Climate Foundation Russell Conklin US Department of Energy Anne‐Sophie Corbeau Columbia University Ian Cronshaw Independent consultant Helen Currie ConocoPhillips Francois Dassa EDF Ralf Dickel Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, United Kingdom Giles Dickson WindEurope Zuzana Dobrotkova World Bank Lynette Dray University College London Cody Finke Brimstone Energy Nikki Fisher Thungela IEA. CC BY 4.0. 8 International Energy Agency | World Energy Outlook 2022 Justin Flood Delta Electricity Nicklas Forsell IIASA David Fritsch US Energy Information Administration Hiroyuki Fukui Toyota Mike Fulwood Nexant David G. Hawkins Natural Resources Defense Council NRDC Dolf Gielen International Renewable Energy Agency IRENA Andrii Gritsevskyi International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA Michael Hackethal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Industry, Germany Yuya Hasegawa Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan Sara Hastings‐Simon University of Calgary Colin Henderson Clean Coal Centre James Henderson Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, United Kingdom Masazumi Hirono Tokyo Gas Takashi Hongo Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute, Japan Jan‐Hein Jesse JOSCO Energy Finance and Strategy Consultancy Sohbet Karbuz Mediterranean Observatory for Energy Rafael Kawecki Siemens Energy Michael Kelly World LPG Association Nobuyuki Kikuchi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan Ken Koyama Institute of Energy Economics, Japan Jim Krane Baker Institute for Public Policy Atsuhito Kurozumi Kyoto University of Foreign Studies, Japan Sarah Ladislaw Rocky Mountain Institute Francisco Laveron Iberdrola Joyce Lee Global Wind Energy Council Lee Levkowitz BHP Li Jiangtao State Grid Energy Research Institute, China Liu Xiaoli Energy Research Institute, National Development and Reform Commission, China Pierre‐Laurent Lucille Engie Malte Meinshausen University of Melbourne, Australia Antonio Merino Garcia Repsol Michelle Michot Foss Baker Institute for Public Policy Cristobal Miller Department of Natural Resources, Canada Vincent Minier Schneider Electric Tatiana Mitrova SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy Simone Mori ENEL Peter Morris Minerals Council of Australia Steve Nadel American Council for an Energy‐Efficient Economy, United States IEA. CC BY 4.0. Acknowledgements 9 Jan Petter Nore Norad Andi Novianto Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, Indonesia Stefan Nowak Technology Collaboration Programme on Photovoltaic Power Thomas Nowak European Heat Pump Association Kentaro Oe Permanent Delegation of Japan to the OECD Pak Yongduk Korea Energy Economics Institute Ignacio Perez Arriaga Comillas Pontifical Universitys Institute for Research in Technology, Spain Stephanie Pfeifer Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change Cdric Philibert French Institute of International Relations, Centre for Energy many looking to accelerate structural change. The three scenarios explored in this World Energy Outlook WEO are differentiated primarily by the assumptions made on government policies. The Stated Policies Scenario STEPS shows the trajectory implied by today’s policy settings. The Announced Pledges Scenario APS assumes that all aspirational targets announced by governments are met on time and in full, including their long‐term net zero and energy access goals. The Net Zero Emissions by 2050 NZE Scenario maps out a way to achieve a 1.5 C stabilisation in the rise in global average temperatures, alongside universal access to modern energy by 2030. Policy responses are fast‐tracking the emergence of a clean energy economy New policies in major energy markets help propel annual clean energy investment to more than USD 2 trillion by 2030 in the STEPS, a rise of more than 50 from today. Clean energy becomes a huge opportunity for growth and jobs, and a major arena for international economic competition. By 2030, thanks in large part to the US Inflation Reduction Act, annual solar and wind capacity additions in the United States grow two‐and‐a‐half‐times over today’s levels, while electric car sales are seven times larger. New targets continue to spur the massive build‐out of clean energy in China, meaning that its coal and oil consumption both peak before the end of this decade. Faster deployment of renewables and efficiency improvements in the European Union bring down EU natural gas and oil demand by 20 this decade, and coal demand by 50, a push given additional urgency by the need to find new sources of economic and industrial advantage beyond Russian gas. Japan’s Green Transformation GX programme provides a major funding boost for technologies including nuclear, low‐emissions hydrogen and ammonia, while Korea is also looking to increase the share of nuclear and renewables in its energy mix. India makes further progress towards its domestic renewable capacity target of 500 gigawatts GW in 2030, and renewables meet nearly two‐thirds of the country’s rapidly rising demand for electricity. As markets rebalance, renewables, supported by nuclear power, see sustained gains; the upside for coal from today’s crisis is temporary. The increase in renewable electricity generation is sufficiently fast to outpace growth in total electricity generation, driving down the contribution of fossil fuels for power. The crisis briefly pushes up utilisation rates for existing coal‐fired assets, but does not bring higher investment in new ones. Strengthened policies, a subdued economic outlook and high near‐term prices combine to moderate overall energy demand growth. Increases come primarily from India, Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East. However, the rise in China’s energy use, which has been such an important driver for global energy trends over the past two decades, slows and then halts altogether before 2030 as China shifts to a more services‐orientated economy. IEA. CC BY 4.0. Executive Summary 21 International energy trade undergoes a profound reorientation in the 2020s as countries adjust to the rupture of Russia‐Europe flows, which is assumed to be permanent. Not all Russian flows displaced from Europe find a new home in other markets, bringing down Russian production and global supply. Crude oil and product markets, especially diesel, face a turbulent period as EU bans on Russian imports kick in. Natural gas takes longer to adjust. The upcoming northern hemisphere winter promises to be a perilous moment for gas markets and a testing time for EU solidarity – and the winter of 2023‐24 could be even tougher. Major new additions to LNG supply – mainly from North America, Qatar and Africa – arrive only around the mid‐2020s. Competition for available cargoes is fierce in the meantime as Chinese import demand picks up again. Today’s stronger policy settings bring a fossil fuel peak into view For the first time, a WEO scenario based on prevailing policy settings has global demand for each of the fossil fuels exhibiting a peak or plateau. In the STEPS, coal use falls back within the next few years, natural gas demand reaches a plateau by the end of the decade, and rising sales of electric vehicles EVs mean that oil demand levels off in the mid‐2030s before ebbing slightly to mid‐century. Total demand for fossil fuels declines steadily from the mid‐2020s by around 2 exajoules per year on average to 2050, an annual reduction roughly equivalent to the lifetime output of a large oil field. Global fossil fuel use has risen alongside GDP since the start of the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century putting this rise into reverse while continuing to expand the global economy will be a pivotal moment in energy history. The share of fossil fuels in the global energy mix has been stubbornly high, at around 80, for decades. By 2030 in the STEPS, this share falls below 75, and to just above 60 by 2050. A high point for global energy‐related CO 2 emissions is reached in the STEPS in 2025, at 37 billion tonnes Gt per year, and they fall back to 32 Gt by 2050. This would be associated with a rise of around 2.5 C in global average temperatures by 2100. This is a better outcome than projected a few years ago renewed policy momentum and technology gains made since 2015 have shaved around 1 C off the long‐term temperature rise. However, a reduction of only 13 in annual CO 2 emissions to 2050 in the STEPS is far from enough to avoid severe impacts from a changing climate. Full achievement of all climate pledges would move the world towards safer ground, but there is still a large gap between today’s ambitions and a 1.5 C stabilisation. In the APS, a near‐term peak in annual emissions is followed by a faster decline to 12 Gt by 2050. This is a bigger reduction than in the WEO‐2021 APS, reflecting the additional pledges that have been made over the past year, notably by India and Indonesia. If implemented on time and in full, these additional national commitments – as well as sectoral commitments for specific industries and company targets considered for the first time in this year’s APS – keep the temperature rise in the APS in 2100 at around 1.7 C. However, it is easier to make pledges than to implement them and, even if they are achieved, there is still considerably further to go to align with the NZE Scenario, which achieves the 1.5 C outcome by reducing annual emissions to 23 Gt by 2030 and to net zero by 2050. IEA. CC BY 4.0. 22 International Energy Agency | World Energy Outlook 2022 Led by clean electricity, some sectors are poised for a faster transformation The world is in a critical decade for delivering a more secure, sustainable and affordable energy system – the potential for faster progress is enormous if strong action is taken immediately. Investments in clean electricity and electrification, along with expanded and modernised grids, offer clear and cost‐effective opportunities to cut emissions more rapidly while bringing electricity costs down from their current highs. Today’s growth rates for deployment of solar PV, wind, EVs and batteries, if maintained, would lead to a much faster transformation than projected in the STEPS, although this would require supportive policies not just in the leading markets for these technologies but across the world. By 2030, if countries deliver on their climate pledges, every second car sold in the European Union, China and the United States is electric. Supply chains for some key technologies – including batteries, solar PV and electrolysers – are expanding at rates that support higher global ambition. If all announced manufacturing expansion plans for solar PV see the light of day, manufacturing capacity would exceed the deployment levels in the APS in 2030 by around 75 and approach the levels required in the NZE Scenario. In the case of electrolysers for hydrogen production, the potential excess capacity of all announced projects relative to APS deployment in 2030 is around 50. In the EV sector, the expansion of battery manufacturing capacity reflects the shift underway in the automotive industry, which at times has moved faster than governments in setting targets for electrified mobility. These clean energy supply chains are a huge source of employment growth, with clean energy jobs already exceeding those in fossil fuels worldwide and projected to grow from around 33 million today to almost 55 million in 2030 in the APS. Efficiency and clean fuels get a competitive boost Today’s high energy prices underscore the benefits of greater energy efficiency and are prompting behavioural and technology changes in some countries to reduce energy use. Efficiency measures can have dramatic effects – today’s light bulbs are at least four times more efficient than those on sale two decades ago – but much more remains to be done. Demand for cooling needs to be a particularly focus for policy makers, as it makes the second‐ largest contribution to the overall rise in global electricity demand over the coming decades after EVs. Many air conditioners used today are subject only to weak efficiency standards and one‐fifth of electricity demand for cooling in emerging and developing economies is not covered by any standards at all. In the STEPS, cooling demand in emerging and developing economies rises by 2 800 terawatt‐hours to 2050, which is the equivalent o