电池产业弹性供应链（英文版）.pdf

Resilient Supply Chains in the Battery Industry Publication of the accompanying research on battery cell production on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action II / 2023 ▪ Analysis Publisher VDI/VDE Innovation + Technik GmbH Steinplatz 1 10623 Berlin Authors Aiko Bünting Christoph Sprung Franz Dietrich Frauke Bierau-Delpont Frederik Vorholt Jan-Hinrich Gieschen Julia Kowal Julian Marscheider Kerstin Zehbe Matthias Trunk Michael Lüken Mischa Bechberger Nikolas Oehl-Schalla Roman Korzynietz Sezer Solmaz Stefan Wolf Steven Neupert Tabea Kirchhofer Vera Beermann Editor Sandra Gensch Mira Maschke Layout VDI/VDE-IT, Anne-Sophie Piehl Berlin, March 2023 Image Credits Cover page: j-mel/AdobeStock | 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Ex ecutiv e Summar y 2 2 Ba tt er y cell manuf acturing supply chains . 3 2.1 Focus on five battery raw materials . 7 2.1.1 Lithium . 10 2.1.2 Nickel . 12 2.1.3 Manganese 14 2.1.4 Cobalt . 16 2.1.5 Graphite . 18 3 Cou n tr y an d mark e t c oncen tr a tion in mining and r e fining .20 3.1 Lithium 21 3.2 Nickel . 22 3.3 Manganese . 23 3.4 Cobalt . 24 3.5 Graphite . 25 4 Eur opean v alue cr ea tion .26 4.1 Raw material extraction . 29 4.1.1 Lithium ore/brine . 30 4.1.2 Nickel ore . 30 4.1.3 Manganese ore 30 4.1.4 Cobalt ore 30 4.2 Material production . 31 4.2.1 Lithium precursors . 31 4.2.2 Nickel precursors . . 31 4.2.3 Manganese precursors . 31 4.2.4 Cobalt precursors . 32 4.2.5 Graphite precursors . 32 Excursus: trade data . 32 4.3 Component manufacturing 38 4.3.1 Precursors for cathode active material 38 4.3.2 Cathode active material . 38 4.3.3 Anode active material 38 4.4 Battery cell manufacturing . 39 4.5 Battery recycling . 39 5 Risks and measures .41 5.1 Potential for own supply 41 5.2 Measures 42 T able of figur es .45 Lis t of abbr e via tions .47 Glossary .48 Appendix 49Resilient Supply Chains in the Battery Industry 2 | 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The transformation of the automobile industry in Germany is essential in order to achieve the climate policy objectives of the coalition agreement. 15 million fully electric passenger vehicles by 2030 is the established goal. This transformation process needs to be highly dynamic if the development into Europe’s leading market for electromobility is to be realised. T o support the establishment of a sustainable and competitive battery value chain, the European Battery Alliance (EBA) was founded. Additionally, two Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) were approved by the European Commission in 2019/2020 to realise the goal of high-capacity European battery production by 2030. Provided that all of the battery cell projects that have been announced are implemented, most of the European automobile industry’s demand could be covered in Europe by the year 2030. A large proportion of value creation and the performance of an electric vehicle are tied to the battery. However, Europe is highly dependent on battery cell imports today. None of the raw materials required for battery cell manufacturing are currently mined in significant quantities in Europe. Europe is therefore highly dependent on the import of mineral raw materials. The global dynamics in the development of cell manufacturing capacities will lead to new or worsening dependencies and shortages, especially regarding the supply of materials. In addition, Europe lacks sufficient capacities for further processing. Notwithstanding the increase in recycling and European raw material projects that have been announced, this import dependency will remain largely unchanged by 2030 according to numerous experts. For example, 100% of the lithium for battery applications is imported today. Even if Europe realises the raw material and refining projects that have been announced to date, Europe would only be able to mine about 25% of its own lithium demand and refine about 50% of the needed intermediate lithium products in 2030. The situation is similar for the supply of nickel, manganese, cobalt and graphite for battery cell manufacturing. A European self-sufficiency with raw materials will not be possible. Europe remains dependent on international cooperation to secure the supply of metals for batteries. Against the background of rising international tensions, resilient supply chains are thus becoming more important. It is therefore tremendously important for companies in the European battery ecosystem to diversify their supply chains. Influence on the supply chain can be increased through partnerships and direct investments. Geopolitical risks also have to be re- evaluated. With the Critical Raw Materials Act, the European Commission is accounting for geopolitical changes and the re-evaluation of raw materials policy. Only the recycling economy will offer a way out of the raw material dependency in the long term. However, the cycle has to be filled with raw materials before the transition to a circular economy can succeed. Battery cell manufacturing supply chains | 3 2 BATTERY CELL MANUFACTURING SUPPLY CHAINS Worldwide exports of goods accounted for more than one- fifth of the global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020. 1 This enormous magnitude of international trade is a key characteristic of globalisation and, among other things, requires closely meshed supply chains spanning the globe. Thanks to today’s global networking, production processes can be broken down and located in any region around the world. Economic benefits arising from cost differences, the availability of production factors and a favourable investment climate can thus be realised. The current disruptions of production processes and commodity flows due to the COVID-19 pandemic as well as geopolitical conflicts illustrate how drastic the risks are for a complex supply chain which is based on a demand- synchronised production. Companies are often able to respond in the short and medium term to alleviate the consequences of supply bottlenecks and implement safeguards, such as obtaining insurance, increasing inventory levels or concluding contracts with emergency suppliers. However, long-term risk minimisation by adapting the supply chain strategy is generally associated with higher costs for companies. Since the global division of labour along the value creation stages has become tremendously geographically concentrated the reduction of risk reduction is to some extent hardly possible. With regard to the battery cell manufacturing value chain, many steps such as the recycling of certain raw materials or cathode and anode production are highly concentrated in China. A high concentration is in part found at the company level as well. The number of existing suppliers for some goods is small. 2 These oligopolies can become a potential problem, especially when the goods in demand cannot be substituted at a reasonable cost. As a result, options for 1 F eder al Ag ency f or Civic E duc a tion ( 2021): “En twicklung des gr enzüber schr eit enden W ar enhandels” (De v elopmen t of the cr oss-bor der tr ade in g oods). Online: h ttp s://w w w .bpb.de/k urz-knapp/z ahlen-und- f ak t en/ globalisierung /52543/ en twicklung-des-gr enz ueber schr eit enden-w ar enhandels/ (Las t accessed on: 30 No v ember 2022) 2 Deloitt e (2021): “ Globale Lie f erk e tt en – K omm t es z u einem R eshoring? ” (Global supply chains – ar e w e headed f or a r eshoring?) Online: h ttp s:// w w w2.deloitt e.c om/ ch/de/pag es/ c onsumer -indus trial-pr oducts/ articles/ globale-lie f erk e tt en-k omm t -es-z u-einem-r eshoring.h tml (Las t accessed on: 30 November 2022) 3 Deloitt e (2021): “ Globale Lie f erk e tt en – K omm t es z u einem R eshoring? ” (Global supply chains – ar e w e headed f or a r eshoring?) Online: h ttp s:// w w w2.deloitt e.c om/ ch/de/pag es/ c onsumer -indus trial-pr oducts/ articles/ globale-lie f erk e tt en-k omm t -es-z u-einem-r eshoring.h tml (Las t accessed on: 30 November 2022) 4 Capor al e t al. (2 019): The WT O a t a Cr ossr oad. Cen t er f or s tr a t egic & in t erna tional s tudies (CSIS). Online: h ttp s://w w w . wit a.or g /wp-c on t en t/up- loads/2019/09/190918_Capor al-e t -al_WT OCr ossr oad_WEB_v2.pdf: (Las t accessed on: 12 December 2022) 5 F eder al Ag ency f or Civic E duc a tion ( 2017): WT O - W orld T r ade Or g aniz a tion. Online: h ttp s://w w w .bpb.de/k urz-knapp/z ahlen-und- f ak t en/ globalisi- erung /52802/wt o-w orld-tr ade-or g aniz a tion/ (Las t accessed on 14 December 2022) the diversification of procurement are in part very limited, meaning that companies on the demand side have few options for reducing their dependency. In the context of battery cell manufacturing, this applies to certain raw materials, such as primary lithium extraction, cobalt, nickel and battery graphite. However, the free trade has been showing signs of weakness for some time. International trade has only grown slowly since the 2008/2009 financial crisis and more governments critical of globalisation have come to power. 3 Furthermore, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in its role as the organiser of world trade has been weakened by numerous in t ernal and e x t ernal c on flicts (see INF OBO X: Goals of the World Trade Organisation). 4 Conflicts are therefore more likely to interfere with international trade relations. It appears that the era of trade that is largely detached from political influence, which follows defined rules and optimises supply chains according to capitalist logic, is drawing to a close for the time being. A shift from a rule-based system with equal rights to a power-based trade regime is looming. This development generates new risks for international trade and increases the need for more resilient supply chains. The mentioned trend is expected to result in greater political intervention in trade matters. Goals of the W orld T r ade Or g anisa tion: Liber alisa tion of the mark e ts, the lo w ering of duties and the creation of a world trade order. Since August 2016, the WT O has 164 member s acc oun ting f or about 98 per cent of the worldwide trade in goods. 5 The Appellate Body as the WTO s permanent arbitrator has been without a quorum since December 2019. A decision to reform the WTO was reached at the 12 th WTO Conference of Ministers Resilient Supply Chains in the Battery Industry 4 | in June 2022, with the intent to re-establish a functioning Appellate Body within two years 6 . Meanwhile the EU has implemented an interim solution in cooperation with 15 other WTO members. The ability of the WTO to amicably resolve trade disputes nevertheless continues to erode. The de v elopmen t of the ba t t er y indus tr y is politic al There is a high concentration of battery industry production capacities in East Asia, especially in China. This is due to the regional accumulation of battery production for electronic consumer goods and the resulting formation of an industrial ecosystem. With the rise of electric vehicles and intensive government support, the regional battery industry quickly scaled up to cover the demand for vehicle batteries. This high concentration causes technology dependencies and reduces the resilience of the European automobile industry. Consequently, subsidy policy measures with steering effects were implemented in other world regions in order to boost the production of electric vehicles and diversify the market. Examined below are the government intervention in China, Europe and the USA, which represent the leading sales markets for electric vehicles in 2021, in this order. China: Electromobility and the battery industry have been supported by the government in China for a long time. Today the country has the largest sales market thanks to subsidies for electric vehicles, which favoured a rapid expansion of the manufacturing base in China over the last ten years. Battery cell manufacturing in China also expanded significantly during this time. Chinese cell manufacturers currently have the world‘s highest cell manufacturing capacities by far . Their shar e of the global mark e t w as ar ound 70% in 2021. 7 Chinese companies also dominate many other segments of the value chain, such as component manufacturing or the supply chains for relevant raw materials such as lithium, cobalt, nickel and especially graphite. In October 2020 China announced the goal that NEVs (BEV, PHEV and FCEV) will account for 20% of new passenger vehicle sales in 2025. 8 China is employing various political 6 W orld T r ade Or g aniz a tion (2022): M ember s w elc ome MC12 c ommitmen t t o addr ess disput e se ttlemen t. Online: h ttp s://w w w . wt o.or g / english/ne w s_e/ ne w s22_e/dsb_30jun22_e.h tm (Las t accessed on: 14 December 2022) 7 SNE R esear ch (2022): P r oduction Ca pacity of Global EV Ba tt er y Mak er s F or ec as t ed t o R each 8,247G Wh in 2030. Online: h ttp s://w w w .sner esear ch.c om/ en/insigh t/r elease_vie w/17/pag e/12 (Las t accessed on: 12 December 2022) 8 ICC T (2021): A GL OB AL C OMP ARISO N OF THE LIFE -CY CLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS OF C OMBUS TION ENGINE AND ELE C TRIC P ASSENGER CAR S (Las t accessed on: 12 December 2022) 9 IE A (2022): Elec tric V ehicle Outlook 2022. Online: h ttp s://iea.blob.c or e. wind o w s.ne t/ asse ts/ ad8fb04c-4f75-42f c-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectric V ehicleOutlook2022.pdf (Las t accessed on: 12 December 2022) 10 h ttp s:// chinadia logue.ne t/ en/dig es t/ china-ends-electric- v ehicle-sub sidies/ ( Las t accessed on: 12 December 2022 11 C OM (2018) 293 final: EUR OPE ON T HE MO VE – Sus t ainable Mobility f or Eur ope: sa f e, c onnect ed and clean ANNEX 2 “Str a t egic Action Plan on Ba tt er- ies” tools to accelerate the electrification of transportation and reach the target NEV percentage, including a flexible tax policy and subsidies. With 3.3 million electric passenger vehicles (BEV and PHEV), considerably more vehicles were sold in China in 2021 than in Europe, where 2.3 million vehicles were sold in the same year 9 . According to CAAM (China Association of Automobile Manufacturers), the share of NEVs in new registrations exceeded the target set for 2025 already in the first half of 2022. The Chinese government is no longer subsidising electric vehicle (EV) buyers effective on January 1st, 2023. Some measures to support EV sales remain in place, for example EV buyers can claim a ten percent VAT exemption until the end of 2023. Also, the credit system for environmentally friendly cars that establishes annual compliance requirements for automobile manufacturers remains. Companies that exceed the EV proportion target in their vehicle fleet can sell excess credits, while those that fall short have to buy credits or pay a fine. 10 Eur ope: The EU deem the promotion of developing a European battery industry a strategic necessary and views batteries as a key technology to ensure the competitiveness of its automobile industry. Therefore, the EU is pursuing the goal established in the industrial policy